SOURCES SOUGHT
99 -- Positioning, Navigation and Timing (PNT) Interference Detection and Mitigation (IDM) Technologies
- Notice Date
- 12/17/2009
- Notice Type
- Sources Sought
- NAICS
- 541990
— All Other Professional, Scientific, and Technical Services
- Contracting Office
- Office of the Chief Procurement Officer, Washington, District of Columbia, 20528, United States
- ZIP Code
- 20528
- Solicitation Number
- HSHQDC-10-Q-00048
- Archive Date
- 2/5/2010
- Point of Contact
- Andrew H. Cole, Phone: 202-447-5586, John A. Ziu, Phone: 202-447-5556
- E-Mail Address
-
andrew.h.cole@hq.dhs.gov, john.ziu@dhs.gov
(andrew.h.cole@hq.dhs.gov, john.ziu@dhs.gov)
- Small Business Set-Aside
- N/A
- Description
- 1.0 OBJECTIVE & SCOPE 1.1 Objective of the RFI: Detect and Localize PNT Interference; Intentional and Unintentional Interference The Department of Homeland Security is conducting market research on sensors capable of detecting and localizing PNT interference, whether intentional or unintentional, with intent to cause harm or to disrupt normal everyday operations of the 18 critical infrastructure and key resource (CIKR) sectors. Additional information on the 18 CIKR sectors may be found here: http://www.dhs.gov/files/programs/gc_1189168948944.shtm. For the purposes of this RFI, interference to PNT systems can be broadly split into 2 distinct categories, unintentional or intentional. Intentional interference is described as deliberate attempts to jam, meacon or spoof GPS receivers. Jamming is the generation of Electro-Magnetic Interference (EMI) of a sufficient power and frequency spectrum to dilute or mask a desired signal. The weakness of the GPS signal level means that even very low-powered jammers will deny GPS reception at significant distances; rendering the task of locating such devices very challenging in certain environments. Meaconing involves receiving a broadcast signal and then re-broadcasting it with a delay, which results in significant errors in the derived PNT solutions. Repeaters or re-radiators have been available on the open market for commercial use until recent enforcement action from the FCC. Spoofing is related to meaconing and is a similar threat to the accuracy of GPS, but the false signal is developed independently of the actual GPS signal and is a variable false signal. Spoofing can theoretically create unlimited errors in position or timing services and hence, increases the potential for confusion and damage, while being increasingly more complex in execution. 1.2 INTRODUCTION As part of its ongoing mission to align information technology investments and improve geospatial service delivery across the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the Geospatial Management Office (GMO), under the direction of the DHS Office of the Chief Information Officer (CIO) is investigating the development of Space-Based Positioning, Navigation and Timing (PNT) Interference Detection and Mitigation (IDM) technologies which will serve the broad needs of the DHS, its component agencies and other departments and agencies of the Federal government. The objective of this request for information (RFI) is to solicit information on innovative and efficient concepts and technologies that would provide the GMO with insight into the current "state of the art" of technologies that could be integrated into a Space-Based PNT IDM from a system perspective. The information collected from this RFI will help to establish a common framework from which to plan for enterprise PNT IDM solutions that the DHS will develop and field in the future. 1.3 BACKGROUND Geospatial Management Office of the Department of Homeland Security The GMO works in a technical advisory capacity to maximize the DHS return on geospatial technology investments, strengthen cross-mission information sharing, and assists DHS component programs in developing collaborative technology that supports their mission domain while conforming to interoperable standards and the IT policies of the Department. With this mission in mind, the GMO develops solutions architectures for the Department and its components. As part of this architecture development, the GMO has identified the need for a centralized Space-Based PNT IDM service that leverages existing federal infrastructure and that can offer the scalability and agility to meet the diverse needs of the Department's enforcement, preparedness, response, and recovery mission areas. U.S. Space-Based Positioning, Navigation and Timing Policy On December 8, 2004, the President of the United States authorized a new national policy which established guidance and implementation actions for space-based positioning, navigation, and timing programs, augmentations, and activities for U.S. national and homeland security, civil, scientific, and commercial purposes. The unclassified fact sheet of December 15, 2004 for the U.S. SPACE-BASED POSITIONING, NAVIGATION, AND TIMING POLICY detailed new and challenging PNT responsibilities for the Secretary of Homeland Security that included: "In coordination with the Secretaries of Transportation and Defense, and in cooperation with other Departments and Agencies, coordinate the use of existing and planned Federal capabilities to identify, locate, and attribute any interference within the United States that adversely affects use of the Global Positioning System and its augmentations for homeland security, civil, commercial, and scientific purposes;" Although other responsibilities are detailed in the Fact Sheet, this RFI focuses solely on the one above. The complete 15 Dec 2004 Fact Sheet can be obtained at: http://pnt.gov/policy/2004-policy.shtml For purposes of this RFI, the Federal GPS augmentations include, but not limited to: a) Nationwide Differential GPS (NDGPS), as managed by the DHS/USCG. b) Wide Area Augmentation System (WAAS) as managed by the DOT/FAA. c) Local Area Augmentation System (LAAS) as managed by the DOT/FAA. DHS Positioning, Navigation, and Timing Interference Detection and Mitigation Plan. The DHS Positioning, Navigation, and Timing (PNT) Interference Detection and Mitigation (IDM) Plan was developed as the result of tasking from the United States (U.S.) Space-Based PNT Policy of December 8, 2004. The policy established responsibilities for multiple departments and agencies within the Federal government, to better plan, manage and protect PNT services, and assigned the DHS specific responsibilities governing the protection of PNT services within the critical infrastructure (CI). The IDM Plan detailed the DHS's initial response to the Policy implementation action and lays the foundation for further planning and actions necessary to meet the Presidential Policy responsibilities. The IDM Plan was approved by the President on August 20, 2007 and is classified For Official Use Only (FOUO). The publicly released April 2008 PNT IDM Plan Fact Sheet can be obtained at: http://pnt.gov/public/docs/2008/idmfactsheet.pdf A more comprehensive PNT IDM Plan Summary from April 2008 that was publicly released can be obtained at: http://pnt.gov/public/docs/2008/idmpublicsummary.pdf The PNT IDM Plan provides the framework and guidance necessary for the DHS to execute responsibilities required by the PNT policy. It establishes the foundation for additional planning and actions necessary to meet national PNT policy responsibilities. The plan promotes improved coordination, cooperation, and information exchange among government agencies enabling prioritized responses to incidents using the best available resources. The IDM plan advocates methodologies, practices and solutions for improved national response capabilities. Space-based PNT services are integral to the technological foundation of the civil and commercial worldwide infrastructure. This RFI is in direct response to the PNT policy and the PNT IDM Plan in order determine technologies that can directly support DHS responsibilities to detect, localize and mitigate sources of interference to Space-Based PNT systems and their augmentations. For additional U.S. government PNT information, including public policy and other documents, visit: http://www.pnt.gov 1.4 CURRENT STATE OF OPERATIONS The use of GPS for PNT related services and information is relied upon by a large variety of systems and applications within the critical infrastructure. This reliance has led to the need to monitor the availability and integrity of civil services. Over the past years, GPS performance and interference reporting procedures have been developed and are currently provided by the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) Navigation Center (NAVCEN), the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) National Operations Control Center (NOCC) and the U.S. Strategic Command GPS Operations Center (GPSOC). These three core organizations collect and disseminate GPS related information providing complementary reporting, investigation status and interference mitigation efforts that deal with enquiries and issues from both military and civil users alike. The differing needs of the users from these three core organizations are reflected by the requirements for information that had led in turn to the development of a variety of un-standardized plans and procedures for GPS interference and anomaly reporting. The IDM Plan leverages all the existing government capabilities, procedures and plans to strengthen interagency cooperation and response to both intentional and unintentional interference in the event of a significant national incident or for routine reports of anomalies and outages. The major goals are the detection and reporting of the anomaly or interference, investigation status, coordination of information, assessment of the impact and the application of mitigation strategies. U.S. Coast Guard Navigation Center General Capabilities The USCG NAVCEN is the primary interface to all civil non-aviation users of GPS. The NAVCEN Navigation Information Service (NIS) has established and maintains a continuous point of contact (POC) that provides a capability for question or issue resolution regarding GPS anomalies and interference reporting, to support maritime and land users with prioritized approach for safety-of-life applications. A web-based software application provides GPS and USCG augmentation systems status information services. The USCG also provides an impact assessment on the Nationwide Differential GPS (NDGPS) during scheduled and unscheduled GPS outages for analysis and comparison. The NAVCEN will process all GPS user reports of outages, anomalies and signal degradation, including aviation users, and routinely forward interference reports to the GPSOC or the FAA NOCC, as appropriate. The overall intent is the resolution and dissemination of information, providing feedback to the users as to why service was interrupted. If an outage event is associated with maritime users, the GPS outage can be verified by the utilization of Coast Guard ships and assets. In addition, the NDGPS system also provides remote monitoring of the GPS signal (an inherent sensor for GPS signal quality) that can indicate problems or GPS outages in the vicinity of the NDGPS stations. This capability provides corroboration of interference and the recognition of significant events without extensive implementation of new systems. To better understand the impact of GPS interference, the USCG regularly participates in DoD Navwar tests and evaluation exercises to evaluate the impact on maritime operations from GPS denial and interference. The flow of information through the NAVCEN upon receipt of an interference report, provides information to either the FAA NOCC or GPSOC dependent on the source of the report and its potential disruption. Any aviation related outages are forwarded to the FAA NOCC for further investigation due to the safety-of-life considerations and associated responsibilities. Information is forwarded to the GPSOC to determine constellation status and impact of satellite outages or problems. The final resolution of a report is concluded by either the restoration of GPS services or the provision of an explanation of the cause of an anomaly. Federal Aviation Administration National Operations Control Center General Capabilities Responsibility is allocated to the FAA for the management and resolution of all aviation reported interference. Due to the safety-of-life considerations, the FAA has well-defined procedures for dealing with the notification and coordination of any interference reports from aviation users, which includes the processing of National Airspace System (NAS) interference reports and specifically, GPS interference reports. The procedures capture the actions necessary to record a detailed interference report; identify whether the reported interference is from an approved Federal-Electronic Attack (EA) test event; coordinate a response; determine the credibility of an anomaly; distribute notification; investigate and locate sources; and coordinate mitigation to minimize as quickly as possible impact on other aviation users. Procedures have been developed to provide timely accurate information to the NOCC, where further investigation, analysis, coordination and assessment of impact will begin. The NOCC will identify all pre-coordinated or pre-approved GPS EA and testing. If the anomaly is reported within the airspace confines of Federally approved (by NTIA or DoD) GPS EA or test operation, the anomaly is not considered interference. These events are considered approved and aviators/mariners are notified, as required, via Notice to Airmen (NOTAM) or Notice to Mariners (NOTMAR). If the anomaly report is outside an approved GPS EA or test operation, the FAA-DoD Liaison, in coordination with the NTIA, will further attempt to identify the interference source. While the FAA DoD Liaison and NTIA verifications are ongoing, appropriate FAA spectrum personnel will research the NTIA Government Master File (GMF) database. The FAA-DoD Liaison or NTIA may contact the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) Communications and Crisis Management Center (CCMC) if necessary to resolve the case of interference. Once the validity of an event is determined, the incident is logged in the FAA's Event Manager and is then subject to further investigation, status suspense timelines, as well as being a mandatory briefing item to senior management until resolution. The anomaly is further examined internally to determine the cause and extent of the impact on other NAS users and augmentation Systems, before being notified to other agencies. The NAVCEN and GPSOC are principal organizations contacted by the NOCC once internal coordination is complete and an anomaly is verified. U.S. Strategic Command GPS Operations Center General Capabilities The GPSOC is the DoD primary point of contact for information regarding status of GPS Precise Positioning Service (PPS) and GPS Standard Positioning Service (SPS), including accuracy and availability; predictive coverage/accuracy information; GPS performance history; assistance in analyzing GPS data; and generation of information to supplement reports covering analysis and findings of outages and signal degradation. The GPSOC is the focal point for the Joint Functional Component Command for Space (JFCC SPACE), to provide electromagnetic interference (EMI) assistance to DoD. The GPSOC is the interface with the USCG NAVCEN and FAA NOCC, and has the responsibility for responding to inquiries and providing information regarding the GPS constellation and the existence of space segment anomalies or issues that could result in GPS outages worldwide. The GPSOC monitors and provides data regarding PPS anomalies and interference on a worldwide basis. The GPSOC is tasked to maintain and provide limited access to a central database of GPS anomalies. The GPSOC accepts GPS SPS and/or PPS problem reports from the NOCC or NAVCEN to assist in the resolution of outages. Per the GPS Operations Center Concept of Operations (CONOPS), the GPSOC overarching mission is to operate, maintain, and employ GPS to produce a desired effect in support of military, civil and allied operations across the full spectrum of conflict. One of the key aspects of this effects-based concept is to provide interference detection, location and mitigation assistance. Inter-organization information is distributed by means of e-mail and web access, and accommodates both planned and unscheduled outages and anomalies. Predicted geographical impact of interference can be modeled using the GPS Interference and Analysis Tool (GIANT) application, to analyze and predict areas of interference coverage. The quality of input data to the model is essential to accurately predict coverage impact and is reliant on measured assessments of interference type, location, power and altitude. Current Architecture Overview Current reporting procedures, investigation efforts and mitigation capabilities were developed and designed to provide a manageable system of inter-organizational cooperation and utilization of existing assets and capabilities. The current procedures meet the initial requirements for the intended objectives of notification and information distribution, concerning interference to civil users of GPS. The services provide a means to allow reporting of incidents or anomalies, investigation of the event and feedback to the user of why service was disrupted. If significant impacts are noted, further investigation and mitigation of the interference source is conducted appropriately. Each organization has distinct roles as previously defined, and plays a defined part in the resolution of such anomalies. The current plans and procedures re-route information to the organization best placed or chartered to investigate and respond. Communications is by email and phone call and there is not centralized common system for managing interference events. Response time is in the nature of days or sometimes weeks to resolve an interference event. Capability Development and Improvement The U.S. Space-Based PNT Policy guidance gives clear direction as to what capabilities are desired to protect the use of PNT services for homeland security and other civil applications. The PNT IDM plan considers how capabilities can be improved to best complement and build on the existing Federal architecture and infrastructure. It is recognized that the realization of improved capability is subject to inter-department and inter-agency cooperation necessary to concur on the path to capability enhancement, inter-departmental agreements and funding allocations. 2.0 RESPONSE GUIDELINES & REQUIRED FORMAT 2.1 RESPONSE GUIDELINES All responses shall be unclassified. The document format shall be either Microsoft Word [.doc], Adobe Acrobat [pdf] formats, or Excel for the cost model only. Respondents shall provide a technical capabilities statement not to exceed thirty (30) pages in length. Page limitations are based on single sided pages, 8.5 x 11 inch paper, single spaced, Arial or Times New Roman typeface no smaller than 12-point (smaller fonts of no less than 8-point are acceptable for graphics, figures, tables, footnotes and legends), and 1-inch margins. Respondents are encouraged to ensure that their submittals are complete and address all items outlined within this RFI. Respondents may provide additional promotional literature in addition to their response as long as the literature conforms to the response format. Promotional literature will not count against the page count guidance. 2.2 RESPONSE FORMAT Responses to this RFI shall use the format outlined below. In order to better assist in the evaluation of submittals to this RFI, respondents are encouraged to prepare a technical capabilities statement which closely adheres to the following format. i. Respondent(s) Background/Experience Respondents should briefly describe their company's background and experience in providing PNT IDM solutions or systems developed for other purposes that can be modified to provide PNT IDM solutions. ii. Technical Respondents should describe in detail the proposed feature/functionality of their solution(s). Responses should outline any special considerations with regard to system installation/deployment, environmental limitations and ongoing maintenance. The best responses will address the following: • A systems solution that will support the "future state" in compliance with the PNT policy and PNT IDM Plan. • Sensor performance including size, weight, accuracy, sensitivity and environmental considerations. • How existing Federal, state or local government infrastructure or other resources (cell phone towers, spacecraft, Continuously Operating Reference Stations (CORS), etc) can be leveraged to provide a solution. • Non sensor hardware requirements • System software/firmware • Network requirements • Accuracy and timeliness of data • Compliance with Federal Enterprise Architecture (FEA) • Adaptability/Compliance with Existing DHS IT Policy/Systems • Scalability • Geographic Coverage for U.S. and U.S Territories • Operator training iii. System Stability & Support • Product Support Levels / Service Level Agreement • Product Warranty • Maintenance, Upgrades & Miscellaneous Support iv. Cost Models/Rough Order of Magnitude • Proposed Solution • User/Developer Technical Support • Estimated Total Cost of Ownership 3.0 RESPONSE DEADLINE AND POINT OF CONTACT INFORMATION 3.1 Response Deadline Technical Capabilities Statements, Cost Models, and all supporting documentation are due via e-mail to the Contract Specialist by 2:00 PM EST Jan 21, 2010. The cutoff date for receipt of all questions regarding this RFI is Jan 05, 2010. Questions shall be submitted to the Contract Specialist via e-mail no later than 2:00 pm, EDT on this date. However, interested parties may list assumptions in lieu of submitting questions. 3.2 Points of Contact The point of contact for responses and questions is Andrew H. Cole, Contract Specialist. Please submit all questions and responses via electronic mail at andrew.h.cole@hq.dhs.gov. Appendix A - References 1. The U.S. SPACE-BASED POSITIONING, NAVIGATION, AND TIMING POLICY December 8, 2004. An unclassified fact sheet for this document can be downloaded from: http://pnt.gov/policy/2004-policy.shtml 2. Positioning, Navigation and Timing Interference Detection and Mitigation Plan, 20 August 2007 (For Official Use Only). An unclassified summary of this document approved for public release can be downloaded from: http://pnt.gov/public/docs/2008/idmpublicsummary.pdf 3. 2008 Federal Radionavigation Plan. This unclassified document can be downloaded from: http://pnt.gov/public/docs/ Additional PNT policy and technical information can be obtained at the website maintained by National Executive Committee for Space-Based Positioning, Navigation, and Timing (PNT), a U.S. Government organization established by Presidential directive to advise and coordinate federal departments and agencies on matters concerning the GPS and other related systems. Appendix B - Acronyms CI: Critical Infrastructure CCMC: Communications and Crisis Management Center CNS: Communications, Navigation and Surveillance CONOPS: Concept of Operations COOP: Continuity of Operations CORS: Continuously Operating Reference Station DHS: Department of Homeland Security DOC: Department of Commerce DoD: Department of Defense DOJ: Department of Justice DOT: Department of Transportation EMI: Electromagnetic Interference FAA: Federal Aviation Administration FBI: Federal Bureau of Investigation FCC: Federal Communications Commission GPSOC: GPS Operations Center (DOD) GPS: Global Positioning System HSI: Homeland Security Institute HSPD: Homeland Security Presidential Directive IT: Information Technology LAAS: Local Area Augmentation System NANU: Notice Advisory to Navstar Users NAS: National Airspace System NAVCEN: Navigation Center (USCG) Navwar: Navigation Warfare NDGPS: Nationwide Differential GPS System NIMS: National Incident Management System NIS: Navigation Information Service (USCG) NOC: National Operations Center (DHS) NOCC: National Operations Control Center (FAA) NOTAM: Notice to Airmen NTIA: National Telecommunications & Information Administration PNT: Positioning, Navigation and Timing PPS: Precise Positioning Service RF: Radio Frequency RFI: Radio Frequency Interference RFI: Request For Information R&D: Research and Development SETS: Spectrum Engineering Tracking System SPS: Standard Positioning Service U.S.: United States USAF: United States Air Force USCG: United States Coast Guard USG: United States Government WAAS: Wide Area Augmentation System Respondents should note that this RFI is being issued solely for information and planning purposes and does not constitute an Invitation for Bids (IFB), a request for Proposals (RFP), a Request for Quotation or an indication that the Government will contract for any items and/or services contained in this notice. All information received in response to this notice that is marked ‘Proprietary' will be handled accordingly. Responses to this notice will not be returned. In submitting a response, you are solely responsible and accountable for all of the expenses associated with your response. The following provision(s) is applicable to this notice and is hereby incorporated by reference: FAR 52.215-3 Request for Information or Solicitation for Planning Purposes (Oct 1997) The full text of this clause is available at: http://www.aqcuisition.gov/far/index.html
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