SOURCES SOUGHT
R -- Assessing Alternative Global Nuclear Detection Architectures - Draft SOW
- Notice Date
- 7/13/2010
- Notice Type
- Sources Sought
- NAICS
- 541611
— Administrative Management and General Management Consulting Services
- Contracting Office
- Office of the Chief Procurement Officer, Washington, District of Columbia, 20528, United States
- ZIP Code
- 20528
- Solicitation Number
- HSHQDC-10-R-00080
- Point of Contact
- Miranda Canody, Phone: 202-254-7151, Phorsha R Peel, Phone: 202-254-7095
- E-Mail Address
-
Miranda.Canody@dhs.gov, phorsha.peel@dhs.gov
(Miranda.Canody@dhs.gov, phorsha.peel@dhs.gov)
- Small Business Set-Aside
- N/A
- Description
- Draft SOW Attached is RFI - HSHQDC-10-R-00080 The Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO) has cross-cutting responsibility for coordinating activities related to the threat of terrorists acquiring and using nuclear weapons to attack the United States. The office integrates all of DHS's work on nuclear-detection research, development, testing, evaluation, acquisition, and operational support. Although the office's work is often seen as focused on detectors narrowly (i.e., devices), its responsibilities are actually broader. Nuclear detection, after all, is a system problem. Effectiveness may be limited by devices, but it may also be limited by the architecture of their deployment, situational awareness, communications, intelligence, cross-agency cooperation, responsiveness to threat indicators, and ability to disambiguate information quickly. Furthermore, and especially in the case of a continuing crisis, effectiveness may depend on sustainability of efforts, forensics, and the robustness of the system to damage. Significantly, effectiveness will depend on the ability to deal with adversary tactics, which will likely attempt to exploit known vulnerabilities. Although the Office is not directly responsible for the operations of the nuclear-detection system or reactions to detection by law-enforcement and other organizations, its efforts can materially affect what is feasible and achievable in both. Adding to these challenges, DNDO must be concerned about the near, mid, and long term threats, which implies the need to invest in a mixture of R&D activities to develop new systems, including potentially game-changing (transformational) systems, acquisition, and the engineering and honing of current capabilities. Given this diversity of responsibilities, DNDO's strategic planning is ultimately a challenging example of portfolio management: how best can it "balance" its activities so as to address all responsibilities appropriately, while exploiting all of the instruments available to it? DNDO is currently rethinking the answers to this question as part of a normal review, beginning with assessing the systems of systems that would be used to protect the global supply chain. These systems include, but are not limited to: 1. The Materials Protection Control and Accounting (MPC&A) program managed by the Department of Energy, 2. The Second Line of Defense Program (SLD), including the Megaports Program, managed by the Department of Energy, 3. The Container Security Initiative program operated by the Customs and Border Protection (CBP) component of the Department of Homeland Security, 4. The Radiation Portal Monitoring System operated by CBP, and 5. The Preventative Rad/Nuc Detection (PRND) program operated by the several state and local law enforcement organizations
- Web Link
-
FBO.gov Permalink
(https://www.fbo.gov/spg/DHS/OCPO/DHS-OCPO/HSHQDC-10-R-00080/listing.html)
- Place of Performance
- Address: The contractor will perform the work under this SOW at appropriate contractor facilities., United States
- Record
- SN02204674-W 20100715/100713235603-0e5ebfbe8c0d1cf64562dd7b52045759 (fbodaily.com)
- Source
-
FedBizOpps Link to This Notice
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