SOURCES SOUGHT
R -- SAFETY-RELATED DIGITAL INSTRUMENTATION AND CONTROL SYSTEM TECHNOLOGIES
- Notice Date
- 4/20/2011
- Notice Type
- Sources Sought
- NAICS
- 541990
— All Other Professional, Scientific, and Technical Services
- Contracting Office
- Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Office of Administration, Division of Contracts, 12300 Twinbrook Parkway, Rockville, Maryland, 20852-2738, United States
- ZIP Code
- 20852-2738
- Solicitation Number
- RES-11-162
- Archive Date
- 7/30/2011
- Point of Contact
- Claudia G. Melgar, Phone: 3014923487, Jeffrey R. Mitchell, Phone: (301) 492-3639
- E-Mail Address
-
Claudia.Melgar@nrc.gov, jeffrey.mitchell@nrc.gov
(Claudia.Melgar@nrc.gov, jeffrey.mitchell@nrc.gov)
- Small Business Set-Aside
- N/A
- Description
- Notice Type: Request for Information Special Notice Synopsis 1.0 DESCRIPTION 52.215-3 Request for Information or Solicitation for Planning Purposes (Oct 1997). (a) The Government does not intend to award a contract on the basis of this solicitation or to otherwise pay for the information solicited except as an allowable cost under other contracts as provided in subsection 31.205-18, Bid and proposal costs, of the Federal Acquisition Regulation. (b) Your response will be treated as information only. It shall not be used as a proposal. (c) This solicitation is issued for (see 1.1 below). 1.1 PURPOSE This is a Request for Information (RFI) and NOT a solicitation. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is seeking to improve current NRC licensing processes for safety-related digital instrumentation and control (DI&C) system technologies. Specifically, this RFI documents a Government request to industry and academia for information on approaches, products, technologies, and/or solutions for incorporating into NRC DI&C system licensing activities a safety assurance case approach. All interested sources are encouraged to respond. 1.2 BACKGROUND Safety assurance case solutions must be able to be integrated into current NRC licensing processes such that ongoing NRC licensing commitments are not adversely affected. Included in the integration solutions is a requirement for long term maintenance of the approaches, products, technologies, and/or solutions augmented with NRC staff training and certification capabilities. Initial operating capability is envisioned in the FY12 to FY13 timeframe. 2.0 DISCUSSION 2.1 CURRENT NRC LICENSING CAPABILITIES To ensure protection of public safety and security and protection of the environment, the NRC requires nuclear power plants (NPPs) to be designed with barriers to the release of radioactivity (i.e., fuel rod cladding, primary system coolant piping, the containment building, and an exclusion zone between the plant and the off-site boundary). To ensure protection of these barriers, generic design criteria (GDC) in Appendix A, Generic Design Criteria, to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations, Energy, Part 50, Domestic Licensing of Production and Utilization Facilities (10CFR50) for currently operating NPPs and Part 52, Early Site Permits; Standard Design Certifications; and Combined Licenses for Nuclear Power Plants (10CFR52) for new reactor designs define design features that must be addressed in NPP designs. Additionally, other 10CFR50 and 10CFR52 regulatory requirements specify restrictions on the conditions under which a NPP must operate. These sets of requirements and restrictions form the bases for NPP licensing activities. In general, a safety assurance case is developed by 1) identifying events that could affect safety adversely; 2) describing the method(s) for preventing or mitigating each event; 3) defining the process(es) for confirming the acceptance criteria have been met appropriately; and 4) specifying the acceptance criteria needed to obtain reasonable assurance that the event has been addressed acceptably. The NPP owner is required to prove the NPP will not expose the public to more radioactivity than a specified threshold value as a result of normal plant operations, specific abnormal operating occurrences (AOOs) (e.g., losses of offsite power), and specific design basis events (DBEs) (e.g., losses of coolant caused by breaks in the coolant boundary). The combination of AOOs and DBEs comprise the set of licensing basis events. AOOs are events that are expected to occur at least once during the life of a plant. DBEs are events that are not expected to occur during the life of a plant. The means by which normal plant operations are controlled and AOOs and DBEs are mitigated comprise the plant safety assurance case. To ensure NPPs are operated safely, safety systems and safety features are incorporated into NPP designs to protect the integrity of the radioactivity release barriers by 1) controlling nuclear power to prevent nuclear fuel damage; 2) maintaining core cooling to protect the fuel rod cladding from failing; 3) reducing stresses on the coolant system piping and the containment to protect these barriers from failing; and 4) isolating containment penetrations to minimize the release of radioactivity. Additionally, NRC regulations require licensees to maintain emergency notification systems and public evacuation procedures to extend the distance between the public and the NPP if excessive releases of radioactivity could occur upon a failure of radioactivity release barriers. Clause 55a(h) of 10CFR50 requires licensees to develop safety-related instrumentation and control (I&C) systems in accordance with criteria specified in IEEE Std 603-1991, IEEE Standard Criteria for Safety Systems in Nuclear Power Generating Stations. These criteria address topics such as equipment qualification, seismic qualification, capability to function with a single failure, separation and independence, implementing digital safety systems, etc. IEEE Std 603 daughter standards and NRC regulatory guidance provide further clarification of the requirements in IEEE Std 603. These daughter standards include IEEE Std 323, IEEE Std 344, IEEE Std 379, IEEE Std 384, and IEEE Std 7 4.3.2, respectively. The NRC licensing reviews of NPP safety systems are guided by Chapter 7, Instrumentation and Control Systems, of NUREG 0800, Standard Review Plan (SRP). Chapter 7 provides NRC staff guidance for reviewing licensing applications for safety systems. Additionally, Chapter 7 provides references to the following guidance documents: 1. Interim Staff Guidance (ISG) positions, 2. NRC guidance for the nuclear industry in NRC Regulatory Guides (RGs), 3. NRC staff guidance reports and contractor reports (NUREGs and NUREG/CRs, respectively), 4. Endorsed industry consensus standards, and 5. Branch Technical Positions (BTPs) on specific regulatory positions. Included in the set of BTPs are topics addressing, for example, software licensing review processes (BTP 7-14), which guide NRC staff through three stages of the software licensing review: process documentation, process implementation, and design product review. Further review guidance is provided in regulatory guides endorsing IEEE standards for verification and validation, configuration management, software quality assurance, etc. The expectation is that following the review process described in BTP 7-14 enables the staff to conclude that a proposed software-based digital safety system acceptably satisfies the NPP safety objectives. Reviewing license applications for DI&C safety systems has been challenging for the NRC because of the extensive regulatory requirements and guidance comprising the licensing review process. For example, in BTP 7-14 above there are approximately 190 criteria the staff considers in reviewing the adequacy of the safety assurance case for a safety-related software system. Further compounding this issue is that there is not a set format for specifying safety system assurance cases. Uncertainties in the assurance of DI&C systems for safety functions in a variety of application domains have been shown to arise from systemic causes, such as in software. In order to learn from experiences outside of the commercial NPP industry, the NRC elicited knowledge from experts with safety-critical software and systems research experience in industries such as defense, space flight, commercial aviation, medical devices, automobiles, telecommunications, and railways. The NRC, with the assistance of its contractor, Pacific Northwest National Laboratories (PNNL) interviewed over 30 experts from seven countries (United Kingdom, Sweden, Germany, Canada, United States, Australia, and New Zealand), from which a diverse group of 10 experts were charged with the following objectives: • Identify limitations in the current state of practice (i.e., sources of uncertainty) that make software assurance heavily dependent on expert judgment. • Identify the evidence that is needed to assure software for safety more effectively, based on best practices in other application domains. • Identify knowledge gaps to be filled (i.e., areas in need of research and development) to enable more consistent reviews and to reduce judgment-based variation. The applicant for certification or license should demonstrate the satisfaction of the safety assurance case goal through a logical (argument-based) organization and integration of the evidence from verification, validation, and audit activities. This demonstration is sometimes called a "safety demonstration" and, in some communities, it is known as an "assurance case" and for the whole system a "safety case". 2.2 INFORMATION REQUESTED The NRC is requesting that the following information be provided: 1. A description and discussion of company capabilities with respect to fulfilling the objectives outlined in this RFI; 2. Experience with developing or adopting a safety assurance case approach into a DI&C licensing or certification process; 3. An identification of shortfalls in the proposed solution relative to the requirements for integrating a safety assurance case into the existing DI&C safety system licensing process and an approach to improving the performance in the licensing process; 4. How a pilot or demonstration or partial review might be structured to assess feasibility of the process; and 5. Any additional information that will assist in understanding your responses to the RFI. 3.0 STRUCTURE FOR RESPONSES Responses to this RFI should be in writing and should be in electronic copy form. Limit responses to a maximum of 30 pages. Respondents shall submit an electronic copy of the response in PDF. The entire submission must be received 60 days from notification. The electronic copy must be formatted to print as typewritten on single-sided paper with one-inch margins on all sides and 1.5-spaced text. Use 12-point font with normal (uncondensed) spacing. The NRC may choose to meet with respondents to this RFI. A meeting would be intended to obtain further clarification of respondent capabilities and technical details. The Government will not reimburse respondents for any costs associated with submission of the requested information. Responses are due no later than July 15, 2011. Submissions should identify a point of contact in case meetings are requested. The Government will not reimburse respondents for any costs associated with submission of the requested information. Telephone inquiries or responses are not acceptable. Facsimile (301-492-3437) or email (Claudia.Melgar@nrc.gov) responses are acceptable or responses may be mailed to: U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Attn: Claudia G. Melgar, Contract Specialist, Division of Contracts, 11555 Rockville Pike MS TWB - 01-B10M, Rockville, MD 20852. 4.0 RESPONSE INFORMATION, TECHNICAL DATA, AND OTHER INFORMATION The NRC will disclose respondent's information to only authorized government and non-government third-parties for purposes of evaluation. Information submitted in response to this RFI constitutes the respondent's written consent to such disclosure. Non-government third-parties will be required by the Government to sign a certificate of non-disclosure prior to their gaining access to the respondent's information. In accordance with FAR Part 15.201(e), this RFI is issued solely for information and planning purposes. It does not constitute a solicitation and should not be viewed as a request for proposal. All information received in response to this RFI that is marked "Proprietary" will be handled accordingly. Responses to the RFI will not be returned. The responses will not be considered offers and will not be accepted by the Government to form a binding contract. Responders are solely responsible for their expenses associated with responding to this RFI. The NRC reserves the right to accept, reject, or use without obligation or compensation, any information submitted in response to this RFI that is not proprietary. The Government does not commit to providing a response to any comment or questions.
- Web Link
-
FBO.gov Permalink
(https://www.fbo.gov/spg/NRC/OA/DCPM/RES-11-162/listing.html)
- Record
- SN02429798-W 20110422/110421000032-8b962967da809ec535e8de512bae682e (fbodaily.com)
- Source
-
FedBizOpps Link to This Notice
(may not be valid after Archive Date)
| FSG Index | This Issue's Index | Today's FBO Daily Index Page |