U.S. Department of Energy, Savannah River Operations Office, Contracts Management Division, P.O. Box A, Aiken, South Carolina 29802

B -- LARGE SCALE DEMONSTRATION AND DEPLOYMENT PROJECT POC Yvonne Torres, Telephone 803-952-6082 E-MAIL: Click here to contact Yvonne Torres via e-mail, yvonne.torres@srs.gov. The U.S. Department of Energy's (DOE) Savannah River Site (SRS), near Aiken, South Carolina, is partnering with the DOE's Office of Science and Technology (EM-50) and the DOE's Office of Nuclear Material and Facility Stabilization (EM-60) in a Large Scale Demonstration and Deployment Project (LSDDP) at the 321-M Fuel Fabrication Facility. The purpose of the LSDDP is to integrate the demonstration of new or improved technologies with facility deactivation and decommissioning activities on an on-going project. The LSDDP will ultimately foster the transfer of successful technologies to future projects at SRS, other DOE sites, as well as projects in the private decommissioning industry. The 321-M Fuel Fabrication Facility was used to manufacture fuel and target assemblies for irradiation in the SRS reactors. Systems and components typical to an industrial metallurgical processes are contaminated with highly enriched uranium (HEU). Building structures are also contaminated with HEU. The 321-M facility is being prepared for safe, passive and protected storage for an extended period of time during which only minimal inspections and facility maintenance are required. As funding becomes available, it will ultimately be decommissioned. This announcement solicits information on innovative and improved technologies in four major categories: characterization, decontamination, stabilization, and dismantlement/ removal. Other technology areas will be considered based on their merit. Technologies should demonstrate enhanced safety, improved project performance, and waste minimization. The LSDDP is not based on technology research and development. Only technologies ready for immediate field deployment will be considered. Technologies previously demonstrated at other DOE projects will be considered on a case basis. For characterization technologies, emphasis is placed on the detection and measurement of HEU contamination within systems, components and structures (SCS's). Decontamination technologies should focus on the clean-up of residual HEU. Decontamination technologies will be evaluated on their ability to reduce occupational exposure and minimize waste. Technologies that render HEU inert or immobilize HEU are also sought. These technologies may provide either temporary or long-term stabilization of contaminants. Roof leak detection and roof stabilization technologies (i.e., rendering the roof leak-free) are also sought. Finally, new and improved dismantlement/removal technologies are desired. This LSDDP is a high-profile project and affords technology vendors widespread exposure. The results of each demonstration will be documented and widely disseminated among the deactivation and decommissioning industry. Vendors will be expected to share in the cost of demonstrating their technology. Responding vendors should provide a detailed description of the technology. Submittals shall, at a minimum, include: 1) technology name; 2) technology provider; 3) technology description; 4) a statement of product or service maturity; 5) a detailed description and summary of previous use at any other DOE site; 6) performance data and specifications; 7) expected benefits; and, 8) address, telephone, facsimile, and e-mail of the point-of-contact. A partial list of specific problems associated with the deactivation of the 321-M facility is provided below. Problem 1 -- Asbestos-containing material are present. There is about 1,200 feet of steam piping (2-inch and 3-inch diameter) lagged with friable asbestos. Friable asbestos lagging also exists on about 650 linear feet of rectangular ventilation duct. Additionally, all exterior walls and some interior walls are constructed of transite panels. Some floor tiles may contain asbestos. Problem 2 -- Characterizing overhead SCS's. Due to the nature of the fuel manufacturing process, fine airborne dust was generated and has settled and collected on SCS's since the mid-1905s. There exists a high potential that much of this dust contain residual amounts of HEU. The overhead areas, which are typically inaccessible and cluttered with fluid piping, ventilation duct and electrical conduit, are a primary concern. Because of the potential for workers to become exposed to residual HEU, many overhead areas have radiological controls imposed for entry and work. Problem 3 -- SCS assay and fissile material control and accountability. Because HEU is fissile, material control and accountability is needed and controls must be imposed to preclude inadvertent criticality. Consequently, any SCS being worked will be required to undergo an assay to determine the amount of residual HEU affected. Determining the extent and magnitude of HEU contamination will also guide personnel safety requirements and support waste disposal requirements. The current safety management program is extremely restrictive; it requires that certain precautions be taken for the movement, packaging and temporary storage of HEU quantities in excess of 15 grams. Currently, there are only two assay technologies available at SRS. The first is a simplebox counter assay device which is limited by its small size and its immobility. The second is a portable assay system that is somewhat delicate, not readily available and requires continued service. Problem 4 -- Cleaning (decontaminating) overhead SCS's. The areas and surfaces of overhead SCS's are potentially contaminate with residual HEU as described in Problem 2. Decontamination technologies with integrated nuclear criticality control processes, devices and designs are desired. Problem 5 -- Water leaks through the flat roof. The roof of the 321-M facility is composed of concrete panels supported by a steel structure with successive top layers of insulation, membrane, and protective material. The roof serves as the foundation for building ventilation system. In addition, several security stations (guard posts) were once located on the roof. Consequently, the roof has hundreds of penetrations; an undetermined amount serve as pathways for rain water intrusion as evidenced by ceiling leaks within the facility. The roof was refurbished in 1985 with a 10-year installation guarantee on a 15-year manufacturer design life. The roof and the installed equipment is exhibiting signs of deterioration due to weathering, corrosion and industrial wear. The roof's flat design and its subsequent inability to adequately and efficiently drain rainwater contributes to the water intrusion problems at the facility. Problem 6 -- Stabilizing contamination in place. The preparation of the 321-M facility for long-term safe storage does not necessitate the complete removal of contaminated SCS's. In many cases, it is more practical and cost-effective to stabilize the contamination in place (within the SCS) such that it is rendered inert and immobile. Casting furnaces, metal lathes, gloveboxes, ventilation ducts, and the floors, walls and roof are candidate SCS's that can have contamination stabilized in place. Characterization technologies (including HEU assay devices and systems) are expected to be demonstrated first. The completion of initial selection of all technologies for demonstration is scheduled for August 1, 1998. Expressions of interests should be addressed to: Yvonne Torres, Westinghouse Savannah River Company, Procurement and Materials Management Department, Building 730-4B, Room 2146, Aiken, SC 29808. Expressions of Interest and comments will also be accepted via electronic mail sent to yvonne.torres@srs.gov and via facsimile at (803) 952-6092. All responses should be received within 30 days of the date of publication of this announcement. (0140)

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