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COMMERCE BUSINESS DAILY ISSUE OF JANUARY 20,1999 PSA#2265Defense Supply Service-Washington, 5200 Army Pentagon, Rm. 1D245,
Washington, DC 20310-5200 B -- SPECIAL STUDIES/ BROAD AGENCY ANNOUNCEMENT DUE 022699 POC Carole
Mattice,(703)697-6259 or Joyce Rose,Supr.Contracting
Specialist,(703)695-2564 BROAD AGENCY ANNOUNCEMENT The Deputy Director,
Operational Test & Evaluation/Live Fire Test & Evaluation (DOT&E/LFT&E)
is soliciting proposals to identify and test highly effective, passive,
ullage fire and explosion suppression systems. BACKGROUND: If an
ignition source is introduced to a fuel tank partially filled with fuel
under steady state conditions, combustion will occur and a flame front
will propagate away from the source. The space inside a fuel tank
where fuel vapors are located above the liquid fuel is defined as the
ullage space. Penetration by missile fragments and detonation of high
explosive ballistic rounds into tanks containing fuel mists and vapors
(ullage) will cause explosive flame fronts (explosions) to be
generated. The pressures generated by these flame fronts will, when
impacting fuel tank structure, cause significant structural deformation
and failure, leading to cascading fires or fuel starvation of engines.
The velocity, at which the flame front travels depends upon the amount
and rate of energy released. A relatively large and rapid energy
release by the combustion process causes a supersonic wave or flame
front with a rapid rise and large increase in the pressure. This
phenomenon is referred to as a detonation. A relatively small and slow
energy release causes a subsonic flame front with a slow rise and low
increase in the pressure. This phenomenon is called a deflagration.
Jet fuels typically deflagrate with overpressures normally less than
200 psi. When the combustion overpressure is sufficiently large to
damage or destroy portions of the structure, the combustion process is
referred to as an explosion. For many years, protection of a weapon
system against fire has usually meant engine firewalls, engine
compartment venting, and fire detection and possibly extinguishing in
the engine compartments and crew stations. These protection measures
were primarily installed to combat safety type fires that occur in
engine compartments. However, studies of the combat ballistic data over
the past 25 years have revealed that fires and explosions can occur in
other areas, such as fuel tank ullage and the void spaces around the
tanks, and that these fires are a major contributor to aircraft loss.
Consequently, a mature technology for the suppression of fires and
explosions has been developed over the past 15 years. In World War II,
the Russians pumped engine exhaust gas into the fuel tanks of their
long range bombers; and the Marine's F-4U used fuel tank inerting in
the wing tanks of their early models. There are many suppression
techniques currently available depending upon the location of the
flammable vapor. Probably the most widely used technique is the
installation of either flexible or rigid lightweight safety foam in
spaces where flammable mixtures could occur. For example, flexible,
reticulated (porous) polyurethane foam can easily be installed in
ullage spaces. As the fuel is drawn from a tank, some of it adheres to
the foam. When ignition occurs in the ullage space, the wetted foam
significantly reduces the combustion overpressure by rapidly absorbing
and transferring heat away from the ignition point. The foam is also
a locally rich zone, and the small pores interfere with the mixing
action that is characteristic of a flame front. Foams typically
displace 3% of the fuel by volume, and approximately 2% will adhere to
the foam skeleton. Inert gases can also be used to inert the ullage
spaces of a fuel tank. Inerting systems prevent the initiation of
combustion by reducing the oxygen concentration of the gaseous mixture
to below the combustion limit; making the fuel-air mixture too rich to
support combustion. The disadvantage to these systems is that they are
big and bulky. Small volume, lightweight, active fire and explosion
suppression systems have also been developed for fuel tank ullage. This
type of system operates by detecting an ignition source and then
rapidly dispersing a chemical fire-suppressing agent. Since the sensors
are line of sight type detectors, complex voids and multicell tanks
require multiple detector/sensors and possibly multiple dispensers.
This complexity can lead to inadvertent discharge or even a false
indication of a fire. These active type of fire suppression systems are
ineffective if the peak combustion overpressures are reached before the
chemical agent is dispensed. Furthermore, the logistics support for the
bottled systems are high. Toxicity and corrosive properties of the
gaseous and the dry chemical suppression agents are also detrimental.
BAA OBJECTIVE: To identify through testing and evaluate the most
promising techniques of passively preventing or suppressing ullage
fires and explosions. The LFT&E Office wishes to sponsor testing of
passive systems which will help mitigate the problems of the fire and
explosion potential onboard aircraft (military and civilian) as well as
other platforms which could suffer from these effects (land combat
systems, ships etc.). Passive systems do not require any interaction by
aircraft/ground vehiclecrew members. They do not require electrical or
other power from the host vehicle. PRODUCTS: The outcome of work under
this project will be a report that will document promising techniques
of ullage fire/explosion suppression and the degree of effectiveness
versus various ballistic threats and capable of integration within
military weapons fuel systems. BACKGROUND: This office funds Joint Live
Fire (JLF) Test Programs which, as one of its missions, assess the
survivability of platforms to a variety of potential threats (including
those which could cause ullage fire and explosion). Over the past year,
this office has found several companies who claim to have developed a
capability to reduce the probability of fire and/or explosion in fuel
tanks. Though similar products have shown promise in the past for
reducing the potential for explosive fires, they were incompatible with
aircraft systems because they displaced too much fuel, were too heavy,
were susceptible to corrosion and/or chaffed coatings on fuel tank
walls. These types of issues need to be resolved before being
integrated with any combat vehicle. The LFT&E office desires to test
the capabilities of new passive systems in a way in which would be fair
and equitable across all manufacturers as well as to be sufficiently
representative from the standpoint of test realism. Hence, the LFT&E
office has structured a program under the aegis of the JLF program and
budget to accomplish these objectives without undue delay and cost.
Our intent is to cover the cost of the test execution with
manufacturers providing materials to make them available for
destructive testing at no cost or liability to the government other
than access to the test data involving their materials. No funds will
be available nor additional time allowed for system development.
SUBMISSIONS: Offerors are encouraged to submit concise, but
descriptive, proposals. Proposals for these concepts will be accepted
until 4:00 PM EST on Feb. 26, 1999. The proposal, including the
original signed copy, five additional copies, and one copy on a 3 1/2"
diskette (DOS-formatted, MS Word 6.0 or lower) all referencing BAA
99-01 must be submitted to: Deputy Director, Operational Test and
Evaluation, Live fire Test and Evaluation (DD,OT&E/LFT), 1700 Defense
Pentagon, Room 1C730, Washington, DC, 20301-1700. All technical
questions concerning this BAA should be addressed to Mr. Timothy A.
Wise (twise@dote.osd.mil). E-mailed proposals are acceptable and
encouraged (provide backup hard copy postmarked no later than 26 Feb
99). Proposals will be selected through a technical/scientific decision
process with technical considerations being most important. The primary
basis for selecting proposals shall be technical (i.e., importance to
passively reducing the vulnerability of fuel tanks due to ullage fires
and explosions). Individual proposal evaluations will also consider
the acceptability or non-acceptability without regard to other
proposals submitted under the announcement; however, due to budgetary
constraints, all acceptable proposals may not be tested. No evaluation
will be made without a proposal to perform the specific effort within
an estimated cost and time framework. Offerors, if selected, must be
willing to cooperate and exchange information with the Department of
Defense. This BAA is for soliciting information test hardware only, no
contracts will be awarded in conjunction with this BAA. PROPOSAL
CONTENT: Proposals shall provide a technical proposal and management
approach. The proposal shall he prepared on 8.5 x 11 inch paper, with
one and one-half line or double line spacing, in no less than 11-point
size, any font. All margins (top, bottom, left, and right) shall not
be less than 1". The proposal shall address and be relevant to the
evaluation criteria listed below. In addition, the proposal shall
include (a) a cover page including BAA number; proposal title,
submitting organization, office code and address, principal
investigator's name, mailing address, telephone number, electronic mail
address and facsimile machine number, administrative/contracting
representative's mailing address telephone number, electronic mail
address and facsimile machine number, (b) a one-page summary
identifying any technical ideas to be pursued and their expected impact
on the state-of-the-art of passive ullage fire protection, (c) a
description of technique, detailing how the system passively reduces or
eliminates ullage fires and explosions, and how it can be implemented
within military fuel tank, (d) a description of expected results,
products, and transferable technology expected from the project, (e) a
schedule for system test availability, (f) a statement of the
technical rationale that substantiates the schedule and justifies the
overall technical approach of the proposal, (g) a summary,
not-to-exceed one-page, of any proprietary claims to results,
prototypes, or systems supporting and/or necessary for the use of the
research, results, and/or prototype, (h) a section describing relevant
capabilities, accomplishments, and work in these or closely related
areas along with the qualifications of proposed subcontractors. The
total proposal must be no longer than 15 pages (not including the cover
page, appendices curriculum vitae). Foldouts shall he counted as a
single page. The contents of the appendices shall be limited to figures
that directly support items discussed in the text of the proposal. If
items are included in the appendices, which are not covered in the
basic proposal, the proposal will not be reviewed. Proposals in excess
of 15 pages may not be reviewed. Proposals of fewer than the maximum
number of pages will not be penalized. An abstract is not a requirement
for submission or selection of a proposal. Any offeror whose abstract
is found to be consistent with the intent of this BAA will be invited
by March 31, 1999, to provide a 25 minute briefing (followed by five
minutes of questions and answers). Such an invitation does not assure
subsequent approval of concept. Regardless of the recommendation, the
decision to submit or not submit a proposal is the responsibility of
the offeror. EVALUATION/AWARD PROCESS: Evaluation of the abstracts,
proposals and brief will be performed using the following criteria,
listed in descending order of relative importance: (1) technical
quality and compatibility with military fuel tanks of the proposed
product/technique, (2) relevance to the ullage protection goal and
impact on the goal if successful, (3) the Offeror's capabilities,
related experience, facilities, techniques, or unique combinations
thereof, which are integral factors for achieving the proposed
objectives, and (4) the appropriateness and anticipated cost of the
technique. Proposals will be evaluated and ranked by a Scientific/Peer
Review Panel. The Panel will be composed of experts in the field of
ullage protection (aviation and ground vehicles). The Panel will
recommend to the Chairman a subset of the acceptable proposals for
award, which will meet the passive ullage protection goals. The
Chairman would then review the recommended proposals. His mission will
be to review all recommended proposals and make appropriate
recommendations to the DOD Contracts office. The approved offerors will
make a concise (30 minute) presentation of the proposals to the
Scientific/Peer Review Panel, usually in the Washington, DC
metropolitan area. Principal investigators of the recommended projects
may attend, as coordinated with the Chairman, who will provide
specific guidance for this presentation, including date, time, and
location. Contract award selections will be recommended by the
Chairman, who will submit these recommendations to the DOD Contracts
office. The Defense Supply Service-Washington (DSSW) Contracts Office,
the contracting agency for this effort, will make contract awards
within a reasonable period of time. The DSS-W Contract Office point of
contact is Ms. Carole Mattice, Contract Specialist telephone (703)
697-6259 or Ms. Joyce Rose, Supervisory Contracting Specialist, (703)
695-2564. A Defense Department member will be designated a Contracting
Officer's Technical Representative (COTR) for each contract, as
recommended by the Chairman. It is the policy of DOT&E and DSSW
Contracts Office to treat all proposals as competitive and proprietary
information and to disclose the contents only for the purpose of
evaluation. The Government may use selected support contractor
personnel as special resources to assist in administering the
evaluation of the proposals. These persons are restricted by their
contracts from disclosing the proposal information or using it for
other than performing their assigned administrative task. Posted
01/15/99 (W-SN288451). (0015) Loren Data Corp. http://www.ld.com (SYN# 0014 19990120\B-0004.SOL)
B - Special Studies and Analyses - Not R&D Index Page
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