63 -- ELECTRONIC MONITORING OF PERSONNEL AND VEHICLES CAPABILITY

Notice Date

September 17, 2001

Contracting Office

U.S. Army Communications-Electronics Command Acquisition Center -- Washington Operations Office, 2461 Eisenhower Ave., Alexandria, VA 22331-0700

ZIP Code

22331-0700

Response Due

November 30, 2001

Point of Contact

Jerry Edwards, (703) 704-2412

E-Mail Address

Deputy PM, Research, Development & Acquisition (jedwards@belvoir.army.mil)

Description

The Product Manager, Physical Security Equipment (PM-PSE) is issuing this market survey to determine the availability of products to satisfy the Mission Needs stated below. Information obtained as a result of this synopsis is for planning purposes only. It does not constitute a Request for Proposal (RFP) nor is it to be construed as a commitment by the Government. The Government is interested in available products which meet the requirements (a) At the system or component level; (b) At the system or component level which could contribute to satisfying them; (c) At the system or component level which could be readily modified to satisfy or contribute to satisfying them; (d) Performance specifications, costs of hardware, installation, and support for a one year period, and lead times; Training and Maintenance and other required support for a one year period; Safety and health concerns, if any; and (e) Extent of competition in the market place. An available commercial-off-the-shelf solution at reasonable cost is desired. Mission Needs -- The Army needs a capability to track personnel and vehicles within specific areas on a military installation in Korea. This is envisioned as a system of sensors or readers placed at strategic locations on the installation in order to identify an unauthorized presence. In the event an alarm occurs, cameras must be placed in the immediate proximity of the sensors to capture an image of the person or vehicle once they cross the permissible boundary. Four operational concepts may be acceptable based upon relative effectiveness and cost. Option 1: A complete real-time tracking system for both personnel and vehicles capable of pinpointing the exact location of a breach, at any one of four potential breach locations, whether it be performed by a person or a vehicle. The system should include a personalized device (such as a wristband or equivalent) that is emplaced on the identified visitor as they enter the installation. This device should only be able to be emplaced and removed by an authorized security person at the gate and should be unique so it cannot be routinely removed. The device should also have a tamper alarm capability that alerts the monitoring station whenever an attempt is made to remove it. In the case of a vehicle, an RF tag should perform a similar function. In addition, the system will provide an imaging capability of the person and/or vehicle at the breach point and at the time of the breach. Option 1a: Identical to Option 1, however, does not include a CCTV capability to capture the image of a vehicle or intruder as they pass one of the four breach points. Option 2: A security badge system with real-time tracking and imaging capability identical to Option 1 listed above except the actual personalized device would be less intrusive on the individual and would be in the form of a security badge with a chip or something similar embedded in it. A similar device for vehicles (RF tag, etc.) as described above for Option 1 would be required. Option 2a: Identical to Option 2, however, does not include a CCTV capability to capture the image of a vehicle or intruder as they pass one of the four breach points. Option 3: This option involves a wrist band or equivalent with notification and imaging of a breach of the boundary without a real-time tracking capability. It is the same as Option 1 except the tracking capability would only identify that someone had either tampered with the device or breached the boundary. No specific, detailed tracking capabilities to actually pinpoint the whereabouts of the intruder would be available under this option. The only information being reported back would indicate a breach had occurred. Additionally, no real-time vehicle tracking would be required; however, as in the case for personnel, knowledge of a vehicular breach of boundary would be required. Option 3a: Identical to Option 3, however, does not include a CCTV capability to capture the image of a vehicle or intruder as they pass one of the four breach points. Option 4: This option involves a scaled down capability with a security badge system as in Option 2, above, with notification and imaging of a breach of the boundary without a real-time tracking capability for personnel and vehicles. Option 4a: Identical to Option 4, however, pricing for this option should not include a CCTV capability to capture the image of a vehicle or intruder as they pass one of the four breach points. For purposes of describing proposed solutions and estimating costs the following sample problem should be utilized. Sample Problem. Camp Mama San is a medium to large sized U.S. Army installation located within the heart of a Korean city with a population of over 12 million. The camp is roughly square shaped, enclosed with a permanent concrete wall eight to ten feet tall. The camp includes two contiguous areas of approximately 3000" X 1500" and 1500" X 500", respectively, with permissible boundaries from which vehicles or persons may not enter the remainder of the installation. The buildings are 1-, 2-, and 3-story structures predominantly made of concrete or brick/masonry construction, with the remainder being wood or aluminum framework covered in aluminum. The terrain is situated on the face of the hill with elevation variances throughout the site ranging to 300 feet. The ground is mostly cleared with typical roadways, grassy areas and decorative plantings associated with military housing areas and minimal forested areas. There are only four (4) "breach points" at which the permissible boundary may be crossed. All sensor, camera, and electronic monitoring activity should be monitored from a location approximately two miles away. There are telephone poles where RF repeaters could be mounted along the route to the monitoring activity. The fiber optic network at the four potential breach points where sensors and cameras would be installed, do not have access to the facility LAN for transmitting sensor, camera, or electronic monitoring signals. The LAN fiber optic network in the immediate vicinity of the monitoring activity may be accessed to bring data into the monitoring activity. Available frequency bands are in the 40.99 to 42.01 Mhz range as long as transmission power is low, (i.e., less than one watt). Alternative frequency bands may be feasible in the area dependent upon required transmission power. PM-PSE requests that interested parties respond to this market survey by 30 November 2001 by transmitting hard copy information on their relevant and specific products, capabilities and qualifications to: Commander, Aviation Troop Command, Product Manager, Physical Security Equipment, ATTN: AMSEL-DSA-PSE (Jerry Edwards), 5900 Putman Road, Suite 1, Ft Belvoir, VA 22060-5420. Additionally, electronic version of the requested information may be sent via email to jedwards@belvoir.army.mil with information copy to jsuarez3@csc.com.

Record

Loren Data Corp. 20010919/63SOL005.HTM (W-260 SN50X8M3)